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COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
INNER CHAPTERS OF THE ZHUANGZI 
To stop making footprints is easy, to walk without touching the ground is hard. 
Zhuangzi 
The Way lies in what is near, but people seek it in what is distant. One's task 
lies in what is easy, but people seek it in what is hard. 
Mencius 
The Zhuangzi is a protean text. Even if we limit ourselves to a discussion 
of the Inner Chapters, we find that just when we think we have under- 
stood the text, a new passage calls into question our previous inter- 
pretation. Consequently, it is not surprising that the Zhuangzi acts almost 
like a Rorschach test: different interpreters see different things in it, and 
what they see there often reveals more about their own preoccupations 
than about the Zhuangzi itself. A. C. Graham reads Zhuangzi as pre- 
senting a sort of ideal-observer view of ethics.1 Chad Hansen has 
depicted Zhuangzi as an ethical relativist, who would be at home with 
contemporary analytic philosophers like Gilbert Harman.2 Benjamin 
Schwartz and Lee Yearley both think that Zhuangzi is a mystic-but very 
different kinds of mystic. Schwartz regards Zhuangzi as being very sim- 
ilar to Jewish, Christian, and Islamic mystics, in advocating union with 
a transcendent entity.3 Yearley, in contrast, takes Zhuangzi to be an 
"intra-worldly" mystic, who advocates detached contemplation of each 
moment of experience.4 And most recently, Paul Kjellberg and Lisa 
Raphals have stressed the similarities between the thought of Zhuangzi 
and both Platonic and Hellenistic skepticism.5 
Some will find this state of affairs unsurprising. It has become almost 
an article of faith in some circles that every text has an infinite number of 
(equally defensible) possible interpretations.6 However, the problem is 
not so much that the Inner Chapters can consistently be read in a variety 
of different ways. Rather, the problem is that whatever the merits of var- 
ious interpretations in making sense of portions of the text, none of them 
seems to do justice to the text as a whole. I submit that this is due, in 
part, to the fact that there are theoretical tensions within the Inner 
Chapters that seem hard, prima facie, to reconcile. Now, there are a 
variety of ways of accounting for tensions or apparent contradictions in a 
text. There may be interpolations in the text by other authors.7 Alter- 
natively, various portions of the text may represent different stages in one 
author's intellectual development (as in Montaigne's Essays). I do not 
mean to rule out these possibilities a priori. However, it seems worth- 
while to attempt to reconcile apparent contradictions before we start 
making efforts to explain why they are there. 
Bryan W. Van Norden 
Assistant Professor at 
Vassar College 
Philosophy East & West 
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Obviously we cannot examine every conceptually possible inter- 
pretation of the text. We cannot, even in the space of one brief essay, 
examine every major interpretation that has actually been proposed. I 
shall consider here a handful of interpretations of the Inner Chapters of 
the Zhuangzi, drawn from Western philosophic categories. The first sec- 
tion of this essay is devoted to explaining these categories, and showing 
how portions of the Inner Chapters seem to defend each type of view. 
The second section of this essay is a detailed analysis of the opening of 
the Zhuangzi. In the third and final section, I propose an interpretation 
that, I hope, succeeds in reconciling the tensions I have identified in the 
Inner Chapters.8 
Distinctions and Tensions 
Skepticism, as a philosophic position, is the doctrine that one cannot 
have knowledge. One can be a general skeptic, who claims that one 
cannot have knowledge of anything. Alternatively, one can be skeptical 
only about certain kinds of knowledge. An agnostic, for example, is a 
skeptic who holds that one cannot know whether there is a god. But an 
agnostic may admit there are many other topics about which one can 
have knowledge. Ethical or moral skepticism, finally, holds that we do 
not have knowledge of ethical truths (whether or not there are any moral 
truths).9 
Ethical relativism, as I shall use the term here, is either the doctrine 
that ethical propositions are true or false only relative to some point of 
view, or the doctrine that all ethical words or terms are relative or rela- 
tional terms.10 Consider an analogy. The word "taller" is a relative term. 
Someone can be taller only in relation to someone else. If someone 
asked simply, "Is George taller?" the natural response would be "What 
do you mean? Is George taller than who?" Similarly, ethical relativists 
hold that it makes no sense to ask "Is adultery immoral?" for instance, 
without specifying some point of view relative to which adultery is or is 
not immoral. The different kinds of ethical relativism are distinguished 
according to what point of view it is that ethical words or propositions 
are taken to be relative to. For example, one might hold that ethical 
propositions are true or false relative to the point of view of each indi- 
vidual person. Alternatively, one might hold that they are true or false 
relative to the views of each culture or society. 
An ethical view is particularist to the extent to which it holds that 
ethical truths are very specific and context sensitive. An ethical view is 
antiparticularist, or generalist, to the extent to which it holds that ethical 
truths are very general and context independent. Hence, the terms 
"particularism" and "generalism" mark locations along a spectrum from 
most general to most particular. A certain ethical view may be partic- 
Philosophy East & West ularist in comparison with another view that is closer to the generalist 
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end of the spectrum, yet generalist in comparison with a view closer to 
the particularist end of the spectrum.1' 
I shall use the term objectivism to refer to the joint denial of ethical 
skepticism and ethical relativism. In other words, the ethical objectivist 
holds that ethical truths are knowable, and are not relative to the points 
of view of different individuals or cultures.'2 It is important to note that 
objectivism does not claim that you or I or anyone else is ethically 
infallible. Objectivism is perfectly consistent with the view that we fre- 
quently are in error about ethical issues, and would profit from examin- 
ing and reexamining our ethical beliefs. Indeed, my anecdotal impres- 
sion is that, among contemporary philosophers, almost all the ethical 
objectivists are fallibilists, who encourage us to learn from others and 
from ongoing philosophic argumentation. Objectivism is also consistent 
with any and all degrees of particularism. Aristotle is a nice example of a 
philosopher who is an objectivist but who is also a particularist. He 
thinks that what is right or wrong in a given context depends very much 
on the particular details of the situation. Indeed, wisdom (or phronesis), 
according to Aristotle, is the ability (not reducible to following general 
rules) to discern what is appropriate in a particular context. But Aristotle 
also thinks that there is an objective difference between what is right or 
wrong, noble or ignoble, in a particular situation, which does not depend 
upon what any given individual or culture thinks about that situation.13 
Let's illustrate these distinctions with some concrete examples. Con- 
sider several ways one might react to the assertion, "Killing humans is 
wrong." If one says "We do not know whether killing is wrong," that is 
an expression of skepticism. In contrast, one is expressing one sort of 
relativism if one says "Whether killing is wrong depends upon whose 
opinion we're appealing to. If you think killing is wrong, then killing is 
wrong from your perspective, but if someone else thinks killing is right, 
then it is right from her perspective." Finally, if one says, "Killing humans 
is always wrong, regardless of the situation," one is taking a generalist 
stance, while if one says, "Whether killing is wrong depends upon the 
situation," then one is expressing particularism. 
Despite the fact that they are frequently conflated, skepticism, rela- 
tivism, and particularism are logically independent. None of them 
entails, or is logically entailed by, any of the others. Indeed, some of 
them are logically inconsistent with one another. Ethical skepticism, for 
example, is inconsistent with the view that ethical truths are relative to 
each individual person's point of view, because it cannot be true both 
that certain ethical facts are dependent upon my own opinions (relativ- 
ism) and that I know no ethical truths (skepticism). For if the statement 
"Murder is wrong" is true (relative to me) just in case I believe murder is 
wrong, then I do know an ethical truth, since I know what I believe 
about murder.14 Bryan W. Van Norden 
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Particularism and relativism are not logically inconsistent, but they 
are logically independent. In other words, you can consistently be both a 
particularist and a relativist, but you do not have to be a particularist if 
you are a relativist, and you do not have to be a relativist if you are a 
particularist. 
One can easily find passages from the Inner Chapters that seem most 
naturally read as instances of ethical skepticism, or of ethical relativism, 
or of particularism. Let's look at examples of each. 
5iE Skepticism. In the exchange between "Gaptooth" and Wang Ni, it seems 
natural to assume that Zhuangzi is using the latter to express his own 
skepticism: 
"Do you know what all things agree in affirming?" 
"How would I know that?" 
"Do you know what you do not know?" 
"How would I know that?" 
"Then does no thing know anything?" 
"How would I know that? ... As I see it, the sprouts of benevolence and 
righteousness,15 the paths of 'That's it, that's not,' are inextricably confused. 
How would I know how to discriminate them?"16 
Other notable skeptical arguments in the Inner Chapters include the story 
of Lady Li and the famous Butterfly Dream passage.17 
~W $ Relativism. Several passages in the Qi wu lun suggest that even the most 
X J fundamental terms in disputation, "that's it" (shi) and "that's not" (fei) 
are relative terms, just like the demonstrative pronouns "this" (shi) and 
IN "that" (bi): 
How can a Way be walked and not exist? How can words exist and not be 
allowable? The Way is hidden by small accomplishments, words are hidden 
by foliage and flowers. Hence we have the "That's it, that's not" of Con- 
fucians and Mohists, by which they affirm the other's denial and deny the 
other's affirmation. If you wish to affirm what they deny and deny what they 
affirm, the best means is Illumination. No thing is not "that," no thing is not 
"this." ...18 
"This" is also "that," "that" is also "this." There there is "That's it, that's 
not" [from one point of view], here there is "That's it, that's not" [from another 
point of view]. Are there really "This" and "That"? Or really no "This" and 
"That"? ... Therefore I say: "The best means is Illumination." ... 19 
Is it allowable? It is allowable. Is it unallowable? It is unallowable. A way is 
made by people walking on it; things are so because they are called so. How 
is it so? It is so by being so. How is it not so? It is not so by not being so. A 
thing inherently has a respect in which it is so; a thing inherently has a respect 
in which it is allowable. No thing is not so, no thing is unallowable.20 
What is Zhuangzi's point here? Consider an analogy. Say you are on the 
Philosophy East & West other side of the room from me, and there is a lectern immediately in 
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front of me. I shall refer to the lectern as "this lectern," while you refer 
to it as "that lectern." If you and I got into a heated dispute, in which I 
insisted that it was really "this lectern," while you insisted that it was 
really "that lectern," it would be obvious to others that this was a purely 
verbal disagreement.21 Relative to me, it is "this lectern," relative to you, 
it is "that lectern." Likewise, Zhuangzi seems to be saying, whether 
something is beautiful or hideous, benevolent or unbenevolent, or right- 
eous or unrighteous depends on one's perspective. For Confucians, 
having greater concern for one's own relatives than for total strangers is 
benevolent; for Mohists, it is unbenevolent.22 
The evaluative terms.Zhuangzi focuses on are amenable to this kind 
of analysis, since, when used in the sense of "to approve of" and "to 
disapprove of," shi and fei refer to attitudes particular individuals (or 
groups of individuals) have toward certain things. Although the gram- 
matical subject is often implicit in Chinese, there must be an individual 
or group who "approves of" X, or "disapproves of" Y. Consequently, shi 
and fei (when used in this sense) are certainly relative terms.23 
Objectivism. It is puzzling that while parts of the Inner Chapters seem to 
advocate relativism or skepticism, other sections seem to advocate a 
kind of objectivism. Thus, in Ren jian shi, Confucius (often used in ArlWt: 
Zhuangzi as a mouthpiece for Daoist ideas) offers the following surpris- 
ingly orthodox advice: 
In the world, there are two great restrictions. One of them is destiny, the 
other is righteousness. Children loving their parents is destiny. This cannot 
be loosened from their hearts. Ministers serving their lords is righteousness. 
There is nowhere one can go where they are not their lords. There is no 
escape from these between Heaven and Earth: they are called the great 
restrictions.24 
Consider also the famous story of Cook Ding, whose skillful dismem- 
bering of an ox serves as a model for "nurturing life."25 Zhuangzi's 
account does not seem to express any skepticism or doubt about Ding's 
success or his skill. Furthermore, the appropriateness of his carving is not 
described as being relative to the perspective of individuals or of society. 
Rather, he "relies upon the natural structure" of the ox,26 and "follows 
the way things inherently are."27 
Particularism. When Huizi did not know how to make use of a huge -F 
gourd that he had received as a gift, Zhuangzi told him the story of the 
man who had a secret salve that prevented one's hands from chapping. 
The man used the salve to help him make a pittance bleaching silk. A 
stranger bought the formula for the salve from him for a hundred pieces 
of gold, but then used it to enable the sailors under his command to win 
a naval battle, and was rewarded with a fief.28 The moral of the story is Bryan W. Van Norden 
251 
This content downloaded from 143.229.1.189 on Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:58:19 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
presumably that the value something has depends on the situation in 
which it is used. And this is a kind of particularism. 
Zhuangzi's particularism generates problems of its own, however. 
For in being a particularist, Zhuangzi does not differ from contemporary 
Confucians like Mencius.29 This raises the suspicion that Zhuangzi has 
some special reason for stressing particularism in the way that he does. 
A Passage 
Now let us turn to a specific portion of the text in the Zhuangzi, the 
opening of the Inner Chapters, and see whether we can consistently read 
it in the light of any of the philosophic categories we have explained. 
In the Northern Darkness there is a fish. Its name is "Kun." The size of the 
Kun, we do not know how many thousands of li it is. It transforms and 
becomes a bird. Its name is "Peng." The back of the Peng, we do not know 
how many thousands of li it is. When it beats its wings and flies off, its wings 
are like clouds hanging from the sky. This bird, when the tides change, sets off 
for the Southern Darkness. The Southern Darkness is the pond of Heaven.30 
The likely effect of this passage on the reader is a combination of awe 
and disorientation. We are first struck by the mysterious image of the 
"Northern Darkness," and then our sense of proportion is assaulted by 
the grotesquely huge fish called the "Kun."31 Before we have a chance 
to assimilate this image, we are told of the fantastic transformation of the 
Kun fish into the mammoth Peng bird. The author dwells on this image, 
giving us a chance to catch our breath, with a majestic description of the 
Peng's wings filling the sky like clouds. But once again we are dis- 
oriented when this huge bird's migration takes it to the Southern Dark- 
ness, which is large enough to be home to the Peng, but is merely a pond 
from the perspective of Heaven. 
The text seems clearly to be trying to shake the reader out of her 
normal ways of thinking. But to what end? Are we being disoriented to 
leave us in a skeptical state, doubting everything we think we know? The 
reference to "darkness," and the skepticism about the size of both the 
Kun and the Peng suggest this reading. But "transformation" is a term 
frequently used in descriptions of sages. Perhaps the Kun and the Peng 
represent some higher level of awareness. We need additional textual 
evidence, however, before we can have confidence in either inter- 
pretation. 
WIH The Qi xie is a record of wonders. The words of the Xie say, "When the Peng 
travels to the Southern Darkness, the water is stirred for three thousand li. It 
mounts the whirlwind and rises ninety-thousand li, leaving with the sixth 
month gale." Images in the clouds, bits of dust, living things blown about by 
the wind, the azure of the sky-is that its true color? Or is that because it is 
Philosophy East & West distant and lacks a limit? When it looks down, all appears like this.32 
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Whether the Qi xie is a book or a person, it is obviously being treated as 
an "authority" of some kind. So Burton Watson is probably correct in 
suggesting that Zhuangzi "is poking fun at the philosophers of other 
schools who cite ancient texts to prove their assertions."33 When, later in 
the text, we find Confucius being used as Zhuangzi's mouthpiece, there 
is implicit a similar skepticism about our knowledge of the ancients. 
Already by this point in Chinese history, there was considerable dis- 
agreement in both the Confucian and Mohist schools about what the true 
teachings of their respective masters were.34 Although both Confucius 
and Mencius had stressed the need to read the classical texts critically,35 
Zhuangzi is possibly the first thinker in the Chinese tradition to suggest 
that we have no way of being sure what the ancient sages thought. 
Skepticism is also suggested by the other parts of this passage. We 
make distinctions among things in reality-horse or ox, right or wrong. 
But is this any more objective than seeing images in clouds or dust? Do 
we know what the true color of the sky is, or do we only know what it 
looks like to us? 
Furthermore, when water accumulates, if it is not deep, then it will not have 
the strength to support a big boat. If you pour a cup of water into a depression 
on the floor, then bits of grass will be boats in it. But place the cup in it and it 
will stick. This is because the water is shallow and the boat is big. When wind 
accumulates, if it is not deep, then it will not have the strength to support big 
wings. Hence, when [the bird] is ninety-thousand li [high], when the wind is 
underneath it, only then does it beat the wind. Its back shouldering the blue 
sky, nothing hindering it, only then does it set off for the south.36 
This passage is the first to clearly suggest particularism. Can things float 
on water? It depends upon the particular situation. A particular object 
may float on one particular body of water but not on another. Thus, the 
Peng bird flies in the way that is appropriate to it. 
The cicada and the dove laugh at him, saying, "We suddenly rise up and fly, 
bump into the elm or sandalwood tree and stop. Sometimes we don't even 
make it and simply drop to the ground. Why go up ninety-thousand miles and 
[head] south?"37 
One of the issues that will be crucial for understanding this piece of text 
is deciding what our attitude should be toward the cicada, dove, and 
(later) the quail. There are presumably two possibilities. Either the cicada 
and the dove are justified in laughing at the Peng, or they are not. From 
what Zhuangzi writes later in the text, it seems clear that he finds fault 
with them for laughing at the Peng. Assuming, then, that they are not 
justified in laughing at the Peng, there are at least two different allego- 
rical possibilities. First, it may be that the only failing of the cicada and 
the dove is that they find the Peng ridiculous. On this interpretation, the 
fact that the two creatures fly so low and so clumsily does not represent a Bryan W. Van Norden 
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failing or a weakness. Given the kinds of creatures they are, flying in this 
way is appropriate for them (just as flying at ninety-thousand li is appro- 
priate for the Peng).38 The second allegorical possibility is that the low 
and inept flight of the cicada and the dove represents the lack of culti- 
vation and skill of uncultivated individuals who laugh at sages and their 
achievements. On this reading, the small creatures are to be faulted, not 
only for laughing at the Peng, but for the limitations that prevent them 
soaring like the Peng. This last interpretation reminds one of the lines 
Stli_ from chapter 41 (Wang Bi numbering) of the Dao de jing: 
When the inferior man hears the Way, 
he laughs at it loudly. 
If he did not laugh, 
it would not be fit to be the Way.39 
It might seem unfair to blame the cicada and the dove for not flying like 
the Peng. After all, they are not capable of flying in that way. But recall 
that the Kun was not capable of flying like the Peng, either-until its 
"transformation." 
Note, finally, that the introduction of an external perspective on the 
Peng's flight, that of the cicada and the dove, gives Zhuangzi a natural 
opportunity to introduce a discussion of relativism, if that is his point. But 
nothing in his description suggests relativism. 
The passage continues: 
If one goes to the nearby woods, one can [take] three meals and return with 
one's belly still full. If one goes a hundred li, one spends a night grinding 
grain. If one goes a thousand li, one collects grain for three months. What do 
those two varmints know! Little understanding does not come up to big 
understanding. A few years do not come up to many years. How do we know 
that this is so? The morning mushroom does not know the dawn. The cricket 
does not know spring and autumn. This is what is meant by "a few years." To 
the south of Chu there is the Ming Ling, which regards five hundred years as 
one spring, and five hundred years as one autumn. In the far off past there was 
the great Chun, which regarded eight thousand years as one spring, and eight 
thousand years as one autumn. This is what is meant by "many years." But 
Peng Zu is nowadays especially known for his longevity, and the multitudes 
emulate him. Is this not pathetic?40 
In discussing how the amount of food required varies with the length of 
the journey, Zhuangzi seems merely to be making a particularist point 
that is consistent with the first interpretation above-that the cicada and 
the dove fly in the way that is appropriate for them. But from the point at 
which he asks "What do those two varmints know!" Zhuangzi seems to 
be contrasting small, narrow, limited perspectives with greater, broader, 
more encompassing perspectives.41 This seems most naturally read as 
Philosophy East & West suggesting the second interpretation: the "varmints" are not in the wrong 
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only for laughing at the Peng. In addition, because of the narrow per- 
spective that leads them to ridicule the Peng, they lead narrow lives. This 
reading is also suggested by some of the criticisms leveled at others 
elsewhere in the text: 
A blind person cannot appreciate the sight of beautiful patterns; a deaf person 
cannot appreciate the sound of bells and drums. And is there blindness and 
deafness only of the body?! The understanding has them too.42 
Zhuangzi now returns to the story of the Kun and the Peng. This 
suggests that Zhuangzi thought the reader would profit from reviewing 
the story after having read the intervening text. 
Tang's questions of Ji are like this: In the barren north there is a dark ocean, 
which is the pond of Heaven. There is a fish there. Its breadth is several 
thousand li. There is no one who knows its girth. Its name is "Kun." There is a 
bird there. Its name is "Peng." Its back is like Mount Tai. Its wings are like 
clouds hanging from the sky. It mounts the whirlwind twister and rises ninety- 
thousand li. It breaks through the clouds and mist, shoulders the blue sky, and 
only then does it set off for the South and head to the Southern Darkness. 
The little quail laughs at him, saying, "Where does he think he's going? I 
jump and rise up, but come down, not going more than a few yards, midst the 
bushes. This is the acme of flight! And where does he think he's going?" This 
is the distinction between small and great. Hence, one whose wisdom can do 
well in one office, whose conduct is good enough for one village, whose vir- 
tue suits one ruler, who proves oneself in one state-they too look upon 
themselves like this.43 
Most of the differences between this version of the story and the previ- 
ous one may serve only to maintain the liveliness of the narrative and 
avoid monotony.44 The closing of this section is new and important, 
however. We are told explicitly to compare the quail (and presumably 
also the cicada and the dove) to those whose talent suits them for small 
achievements, and who cannot see the point (or perhaps even the pos- 
sibility) of greater achievements. 
The description of the quail, in conjunction with what follows, 
apparently gives us a hierarchy of stages along the road to sagehood: 
Yet Song Rongzi would smile at them. Moreover, were the whole world to 5'- 
praise him, he would not be encouraged; were the whole world to condemn 
him, he would not be discouraged. He was unwavering in the distinction 
between internal and external. He distinguished the boundary between glory 
and disgrace. But that was all. He was one who was not anxious about [the 
things of] the world, but there was still ground he left unturned. Now, Liezi YIf- 
went riding the wind. Gracefully fine it was. Only after ten and five days did 
he return. The former, in regard to the highest good fortune, was not anxious. 
The latter, although he avoided walking, still had something he relied upon. If 
he had only ridden the true course of Heaven and Earth, and mounted the Bryan W. Van Norden 
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changes of the six qi, so as to wander the limitless, then what would he have 
had to rely upon! Hence it is said, "The highest person has no self. The dae- 
monic person has no achievement. The sagely person has no fame."45 
We have, then, four levels. (1) The lowest level is that of the cicada, 
dove, quail, and others whose talents suit them only for minor achieve- 
ments, but who scoff at the life of the sage. (2) The next level is exem- 
plified by Song Rongzi, who was indifferent o the praise and blame of 
the world as well as the common distinctions between glory and dis- 
grace.46 (3) Still higher is Liezi, whose actions seem magical. The only 
limitation he has is that there is something that he "relied upon." (4) 
Finally, the description of the sage (symbolized by the Peng), is ecstatic, 
but lacks much content. However, we do know that the sage does not 
"rely upon" anything (not even the "magic" that Liezi uses), and that she 
has no "self," "achievement," or "fame." 
Now that we have looked at the opening of the Zhuangzi in 
some detail, how well do relativism, particularism, and skepticism do 
in making sense of it? It seems hard to maintain a relativist reading of 
the passage. Relativism would hold that what the cicada, dove, and 
quail thought was true was true, from their perspective. But Zhuangzi's 
point seems clearly to be that the views of those "varmints" are simply 
mistaken. Perhaps the only error of the cicada, dove, and quail is their 
failure to recognize that their own perspective on the world is not 
privileged; there are other perspectives on the world that are just as 
"allowable" as their own. However, recognition that one's own per- 
spective is not privileged does not entail that one should not or cannot 
judge others. The cicada, dove, and quail are not violating relativism by 
ridiculing the Peng, because relative to their perspective the Peng is 
ridiculous. 
The unfavorable comparison of the "varmints" to the Peng and the 
spiritual hierarchy at the end of the passage seem to require an objecti- 
vist reading. At least, I cannot see how else to make sense of them. But 
this leaves us with a serious problem. For, as we saw, parts of the Inner 
Chapters suggest relativism, and other parts suggest skepticism. How are 
we to reconcile these with the seemingly objectivist passages? 
A Proposed Synthesis 
In order to see our way out of this tangle, I think we need to get a 
clearer idea of what Zhuangzi's "positive project" is. In other words, 
what is the "highest person," "sage," or "daemonic person" like? Con- 
il1 sider the passage in Ren jian shi, in which Confucius tells Yan Hui to 
"fast" his heart: 
"Do not listen with your ears, but listen with your heart. Do not listen with 
Philosophy East & West your heart, but listen with the qi. Listening stops at the ears. The heart stops at 
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what matches it. The qi is empty and waits upon things. The Way alone 
accumulates emptiness.47 Emptiness is the fasting of the heart." 
Yan Hui said, "When I had not yet begun to receive your guidance, I was 
definitely Hui. Now that I have received your guidance, there has never been 
a Hui. Can this be called emptiness?" 
The master said, "Exactly!"48 
This passage presents a hierarchy of sources of guidance. We might seek 
guidance from (1) what our ears hear (that is, from words or doctrines), 
(2) from our heart, or (3) from the qi. Zhuangzi advises us to avoid lis- 
tening to either doctrines or our heart. Instead, we should fast or empty 
our heart, so that we can be guided by the qi. When we succeed in 
doing so, we will (like Yan Hui) experience a loss of our sense of being 
an individual self.49 
It is not often noticed that this passage closely parallels Mengzi 2A2, 
in which Mencius says: 
Gaozi said, "What you do not get from doctrines (yan), do not seek for in 
your heart. What you do not get from your heart, do not seek for in the qi." 
"What you do not get from your heart, do not seek for in the qi," is allowable. 
"What you do not get from doctrines, do not seek for in your heart," is 
unallowable.50 
Here we have the same hierarchy of doctrines, heart, and qi, but with a 
very different evaluation.51 Mencius agrees with Zhuangzi (and both 
disagree with Gaozi) in holding that doctrines are not to be regarded as 
the ultimate source of moral guidance.52 However, Mencius disagrees 
with Zhuangzi, in that he advocates cultivating, rather than fasting, the 
impulses of the heart, and holds that the qi is not a source of moral 
guidance. 
What is the consequence of fasting, as opposed to cultivating, the 
heart? Recall that the heart is the seat of evaluative judgments, including 
(as Mencius stresses) shi and fei, "approval" and "disapproval."53 Recall, 
further, that it is specifically "approval" and "disapproval" that Zhuangzi 
regards as relative terms in Qi wu lun. Consequently, fasting the heart 
will lead to a de-emphasis of that sort of relative ethical judgment. That 
is, the sage will be less inclined to make judgments of approval and dis- 
approval, and will regard those judgments as less important. Does this 
mean that the sage's life will be aimless and desultory? No, because 
Zhuangzi thinks there is another source of guidance besides the heart. 
The sage will be guided by the impersonal qi. 
Achieving the state in which one is guided by the qi is very difficult 
because (as Mencius' doctrine of the four sprouts emphasizes) humans 
naturally and spontaneously make evaluative judgments. Indeed, part 
of the attraction of Mencian thought is that it appeals to what seem 
(to many of us, at least) to be our pre-reflective, commonsense ethical Bryan W. Van Norden 
257 
This content downloaded from 143.229.1.189 on Mon, 20 Apr 2015 17:58:19 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
convictions, including compassion toward suffering creatures,54 greater 
concern for friends and relatives than for complete strangers,55 and 
shame at being treated with contempt.56 Consequently, Zhuangzi will 
have to get the average person to stop listening to common sense, as it is 
embodied both in what most people say ("do not listen with your ears") 
and in the convictions of one's heart ("do not listen with your heart"), 
HW before she can achieve "Illumination" (ming). I think Zhuangzi saw that 
skeptical arguments can play an important role in achieving this goal. 
How? Remember that there are a variety of different kinds of skepti- 
cism, and a variety of uses to which skeptical arguments can be put. 
Plato, for example, used the technique of Socratic questioning to induce 
doubt, but only as a means of making the mind receptive to real knowl- 
edge. Descartes tried to doubt everything, but he did so as a means 
to finding an "Archimedean point" of certainty from which he could 
reconstruct genuine knowledge. In general, we might use the term ther- 
apeutic skepticism to refer to the use of skeptical arguments to clear 
away previous convictions in order to make one more receptive to dif- 
ferent convictions. Zhuangzi, I submit, is a therapeutic skeptic. He uses 
skeptical arguments to make us doubt many of our commonsense 
beliefs. But his goal is not merely to leave us in a state of doubt; his goal 
is to use doubt to make us more receptive to different convictions. He 
disorients us so that he can reorient us. Or, to use his own vocabulary, 
Zhuangzi employs therapeutic skepticism as a way of making the heart 
"empty," so that one can successfully "listen with the qi." 
The importance of overcoming limited, commonsense views is also 
suggested by the opening of the Inner Chapters. The cicada, dove, and 
quail, relying on their common sense, ridicule the majestic and miracu- 
lous Peng, and Zhuangzi condemns them for it. Furthermore, the spiri- 
tual hierarchy at the end of the passage represents greater and greater 
separation from common sense. Song Rongzi is praised for rejecting 
conventional views about honor and disgrace, and the magical behavior 
of Liezi and the highest sage defies common sense. 
But if Zhuangzi wants us to go beyond common sense, what about 
the orthodox advice concerning the "great restrictions" he has Confucius 
offer in Ren jian shi?57 There are a number of strategies for integrating 
these comments with the anticonventionalism of other parts of the 
Zhuangzi. I shall examine only three of them. It may be that (1) Con- 
fucius' discussion of the "great restrictions" represents merely a stage 
along the road to complete sagehood that will later be surpassed. This 
reading gains support from the fact that in other passages Confucius is 
7ltiN represented as being inferior to other sages, as in the Da zong shi, where 
he comments that certain sages "are such as wander beyond the realm, 
while I am such as wander within the realm."58 Alternatively, Lee Year- 
Philosophy East & West ley has proposed that (2) there are two distinct visions of sagehood 
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within the Zhuangzi: the radical and the conventional.59 The view that 
everyone is bound by the "great restrictions" might be part of a domes- 
ticated, exoteric Daoist vision, while the view that the sage completely 
ceases to make ethical judgments is part of a more extreme, esoteric 
vision. Finally, it may be that (3) according to Zhuangzi, the highest sage 
does continue to make ethical judgments. However, she makes them in 
awareness of their relativity, and is primarily guided by the promptings of 
the qi. (After all, Zhuangzi has Confucius advise us to "fast" the heart, 
not to "starve" it.) This reading is suggested by Watson's interpretation of 
a passage from Qi wu lun: 
Therefore the sage . . .too recognizes a "this," but a "this" which is also 
"that," a "that" which is also "this." His "that" has both a right and a wrong 
in it; his "this" too has both a right and a wrong in it.60 
Also suggestive of the third interpretation is Zhuangzi's comment that 
"Outside the six directions the sage exists but does not categorize. 
Within the six directions, the sage categorizes but does not debate."61 
My tentative suggestion (made with full awareness of the difficulty of 
achieving certainty on so subtle a point) is that the highest sage does not 
make evaluative judgments at all. Several passages suggest this. For exam- 
ple, Zhuangzi writes that "The true persons of old did not know to delight 
in life. They did not know to hate death.... This is called not hurting the 
Way with the heart."62 Similarly, when Yan Hui tells Confucius that he 
has become "identical with the great universal," Confucius comments, 
"If you are identical with it, then you are without fondnesses."63 
If the highest sage does not make evaluative judgments, this leaves 
us with the first and second interpretations. It may be that both are true to 
a certain extent. I suspect that Zhuangzi thought that true "Illumination" 
consisted in not making evaluative judgments at all. However, Zhuangzi, 
despite all his fancies, was, like almost all early Chinese philosophers, 
interested in providing practical advice that people could actually follow. 
Recognizing that few could achieve and consistently maintain the emp- 
tiness of heart he thought ideal, he held out the lesser ideal of the sage 
who lives within the restrictions of conventional moral judgments, while 
recognizing thatthese judgments are not expressions of the Will of Heaven. 
We are now in a position to see how Zhuangzi's particularism differs 
from that of his contemporaries. Zhuangzi, I submit, stresses particular- 
ism for two reasons. First, it is important for us to recognize that the sage 
acts differently, not because she is foolish, but because her goals are 
different from those of ordinary people. Different goals make different 
actions appropriate. There is no perfectly general rule for how people 
should behave independently of their ends. Second, by stressing flexible 
responsiveness to particular contexts, Zhuangzi encourages us to think in 
creative and nontraditional ways. This frees the mind to see the value of Bryan W. Van Norden 
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the Daoist way of life. One who has achieved the intellectual flexibility 
to recognize that a gourd (although normally used as a ladle) can (if big 
enough) also serve as a boat has also achieved the flexibility to see the 
value in things at which the many laugh.64 
Summary and Conclusion 
Zhuangzi's sage rejects almost all of the judgments and convictions 
that characterize conventional common sense. Consequently, before 
one can achieve the Illumination characteristic of the sage, one must be 
made to doubt many of one's ordinary convictions, including the belief 
that death is a great loss, and that earthly fame and success are great 
goods. Zhuangzi employs a sort of therapeutic skepticism to help instill 
doubt about these convictions. Also helpful in walking the path toward 
Illumination is Zhuangzi's stress on particularism, which gets us used to 
seeing old things in new ways. 
Part of achieving Illumination is coming to see that conventional 
i, ethical judgments are not an expression of "Heaven's intent" (Tian zhi) 
i or "Heaven's decree" (Tian ming), but are merely a kind of self-assertion. 
These judgments, being mere expressions of preference, are relative. In- 
stead of clinging to these expressions of preference, the sage empties her 
heart, and is guided by the impersonal qi, which flows through all things. 
When she does so, her mind becomes like a placid pool, which mirrors 
what is before it. And like Cook Ding, she "follows the way things in- 
herently are," as opposed to the way her heart would like things to be, 
and thereby manifests amazing skillfulness. 
The Inner Chapters raise deep and difficult issues about human life. 
They deserve careful and detailed critical treatment that I cannot give 
them here. However, I would like, in closing, at least to sketch some of the 
philosophic issues raised byZhuangZhou. Whatdoes the life of Zhuangzi's 
sage have to recommend it? Two features stand out. The sage manifests 
almost miraculous skillfulness, and she is, in a sense, impervious to injury. 
Zhuangzi is right to draw our attention to the beauty and efficiency 
Tc of wu wei (inaction).65 This is something that has been either ignored or 
WA denigrated by most Western philosophers, in favor of you wei. None- 
theless, our popular culture places high value on certain forms of wu 
wei. Thus, crowds marvel at the basketball player who is "in the zone" 
or "unconscious." As important and impressive as wu wei is, however, 
one wonders whether such activity can really be the paradigm for one's 
life as a whole. Especially in a society as complicated and rapidly 
changing as our own, it seems that you wei activity will have to pre- 
dominate. After all, even the top athletes turn to you wei when renego- 
tiating their contracts. 
In what way is Zhuangzi's sage impervious to harm? Sometimes (as 
Philosophy East & West in the opening of the Inner Chapters) Zhuangzi describes the sage in 
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terms that suggest she has magical powers. However, it is at least pos- 
sible to read these descriptions allegorically.66 Furthermore, given what 
Zhuangzi tells us about the sage, we can see that she does not need the 
assistance of magic to be impervious. If one lacks a self, and lacks the 
preferences and commitments that are definitive of a self, then there is no 
self to be injured or to suffer loss. Students of Western philosophy will 
recognize Zhuangzi's sage as someone who is attempting to escape what 
Martha Nussbaum has called "the fragility of goodness." It seems that 
goodness is fragile because luck is required in order successfully to lead 
a flourishing life.67 In the West, various thinkers (most notably Platonists 
and Stoics) have thought it was possible to escape the need for such 
luck, by living a life in accordance with reason. From this perspective, 
what is striking about Zhuangzi's sage is that she, too, attempts to escape 
the fragility of goodness, but she does so without any emphasis on 
reason. 
Now, there is undeniably something attractive about escaping "that 
monster, Fortune ... [who] pretends to be friendly to those she intends to 
cheat, and disappoints those she unexpectedly leaves with intolerable 
sorrow."68 But doing so has its costs, and it is far from clear whether the 
price is worth paying. What good, after all, is it if "I" achieve invulner- 
ability, at the cost of eliminating all the commitments that made this "I" 
what it was? At this point we begin to see more clearly, I think, the 
choice that Mencius and Zhuangzi represent within Chinese thought. 
Zhuangzi asks us to transform ourselves, so that, like the Peng, we can fly 
high above ordinary human life. Even though we continue to exist and 
act within human society, we will not share the beliefs and commitments 
of ordinary humans. We will "walk without touching the ground."69 In 
contrast, Mencius offers us a life rich in commitments and, consequently, 
vulnerability: "Determined scholars do not forget they may end up in a 
ditch; courageous scholars do not forget they may lose their heads" 
(Mengzi 3B1, 5B7). And although Mencius tells us to cultivate ourselves, 
this cultivation will strengthen, rather than uproot, our natural instincts 
and inclinations: 
The Way lies in what is near, but people seek it in what is distant. One's task 
lies in what is easy, but people seek it in what is difficult. If everyone would 
treat their kin as kin should be treated, and treat their elders as elders should 
be treated, the world would be at peace.70 
NOTES 
I am indebted to P. J. Ivanhoe, Paul Kjellberg, Eric Schwitzgebel, and two 
anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Bryan W. Van Norden 
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1 - A. C. Graham, "Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of 'Is' and 
'Ought'," in Victor Mair, ed., Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 3-23. For criticisms 
of ideal observer theories similar to Graham's, see Bernard Williams, 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), pp. 83-92. For criticisms directed specifically at Gra- 
ham's version, see Yukio Kachi's comments, and Graham's response, 
in Philosophy East and West 40 (3) (July 1990): 389-398 and 399, 
respectively. See also Herbert Fingarette, "Reason, Spontaneity, and 
the Li-A Confucian Critique of Graham's Solution to the Problem of 
Fact and Value"; Henry Rosemont, "Who Chooses?"; and Graham's 
responses to these papers, in Henry Rosemont, ed., Chinese Texts 
and Philosophical Contexts (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991), 
pp. 209-225, 227-263, and 297-321, respectively. 
2 - Chad Hansen, "A Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu," in Mair, Experimental 
Essays on Chuang-tzu, pp. 24-55. Hansen presents a different 
interpretation of Zhuangzi in A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), chap. 8. See my review 
of this book in Ethics 105 (2) (January 1995): 433-435. For Har- 
man's views, see note 10 below. 
3 - Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1985), pp. 192-194, 215-237. 
4 - Lee Yearley, "The Perfected Person in the Radical Chuang-tzu," in 
Mair, Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, pp. 125-139. For a crit- 
ical discussion of these and other interpretations of the Zhuangzi, 
see Paul Kjellberg, "Zhuangzi and Skepticism" (Ph.D. diss., Stan- 
ford University, 1993). A series of new and challenging inter- 
pretations of the Zhuangzi is forthcoming in Paul Kjellberg and 
Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds., Essays on Skepticism, Relativism and Ethics 
in the Zhuangzi (Albany, New York, SUNY Press, 1996). 
5 - Paul Kjellberg, "Skepticism, Truth, and the Good Life: A Compari- 
son of Zhuangzi and Sextus Empiricus," Philosophy East and West 
44 (1) (January 1994): 111-133; Lisa Raphals, "Skeptical Strategies 
in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus," Philosophy East and West 44 (3) 
(July 1994): 501-526. 
6- I assume in this essay that even if there is no one correct inter- 
pretation of a text like the Inner Chapters, there are (in some sense 
which is not purely subjective) better and worse interpretations. For 
criticisms of some of the more extreme alternative views, see John 
M. Ellis, Against Deconstruction (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989), and Umberto Eco et al., Interpretation and Over- 
Philosophy East & West interpretation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
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7 - Philological analyses of the Zhuangzi suggest that the Inner Chap- 
ters, at least, are by one author. See A. C. Graham, "How Much of 
Chuang-tzu Did Chuang-tzu Write?" in his Studies in Chinese Phi- 
losophy and Philosophical Literature (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 
pp. 283-321, and Harold Roth, "Who Compiled the Chuang Tzu?" 
in Rosemont, Chinese Texts, pp. 79-128. 
8 - My interpretation is very similar to that advanced by P. J. Ivanhoe, 
in "Zhuangzi on Skepticism, Skill and the Ineffable Dao," Journal 
of the American Academy of Religion 61 (4) (Winter 1993): 101- 
116. In addition, my understanding of "therapeutic skepticism" 
(see above, "A Proposed Synthesis") has been influenced by 
Raphals' notion of "method skepticism" ("Skeptical Strategies in 
the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus"). 
9 - J. L. Mackie uses the term "moral scepticism [sic]" to refer to moral 
antirealism, the view that there are no objective moral facts or 
properties (see his Ethics [New York: Penguin Books, 1977], pp. 
15-17). However, this is a nonstandard use. On this point, see 
David O. Brink, "Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from 
Disagreement and Queerness," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
62 (2) (June 1984): 111-112. 
10 - This is not the only way in which the phrase is used. What I am 
calling "ethical relativism" is very close to what Gilbert Harman 
has labeled "moral judgment relativism." See his "What Is Moral 
Relativism?" in A. I. Goldman and J. Kim, eds., Values and Morals 
(Boston: D. Reidel, 1978), pp. 143-161. For another typology of 
kinds of relativism, see David Wong, "Relativism," in Peter Singer, 
ed., A Companion to Ethics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil 
Blackwell, 1991), pp. 442-450. 
11 - For a discussion and defense of particularism, see Jonathan Dancy, 
"Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties," Mind 92 
(1983): 530-547. 1 use the term "particularism" more broadly than 
Dancy, to cover both what he calls "particularism" and what he 
would call "pluralism." 
12 - The term "Objectivism" is also used to describe the philosophy of 
Ayn Rand. I am not using the term in that sense, however. 
13 - Martha Nussbaum is the contemporary philosopher who has done 
the most to explicate and defend these aspects of Aristotle's 
thought. See, e.g., her The Fragility of Goodness (New York: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1986), esp. pp. 298-306, and Love's 
Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 
54-105. See also the seminal essay by David Wiggins, "Deliber- 
ation and Practical Reason," in A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aris- Bryan W. Van Norden 
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totle's Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 
221-240. 
14 - Strictly speaking, ethical skepticism would be consistent with indi- 
vidual relativism given one assumption: one cannot know what 
one's own beliefs are. However, while it is true that we may have 
some subconscious beliefs that we do not know we have, it seems 
very implausible to suggest that we cannot know any of our own 
ethical beliefs. 
15 - This is almost certainly a criticism of Mencius, who refers to "the 
sprout of benevolence" and "the sprout of righteousness" in 
r]~if: ~ Mengzi 2A6. 
16 - Translations are my own, although I have relied heavily on Burton 
Watson, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia Uni- 
versity Press, 1964), and A. C. Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner 
Chapters (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1981). For comparative pur- 
poses, I shall provide references to the corresponding passages in 
these translations, and in the Harvard-Yenching concordance to the 
Zhuangzi: Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 58; Watson, Basic Writings, 
pp. 40-41; HY 6/2/64-65, 70. I have also made use of the com- 
~1S, X A'~ ffF T mentary in Guo Qingfan, ed., Zhuangzi jishi (Taibei: Huazheng 
Shuju, 1987), and the commentary and translations in Huang Jin- 
X.N Rp I ff- Fhong, Zhuangzi duben (Taibei: Sanmin Shuju, 1974). 
17 - For the former, see Graham, Inner Chapters, pp. 59-60; Watson, 
Basic Writings, pp. 42-43; HY 6/2/79-81. For the latter, see Gra- 
ham, Inner Chapters, p. 61; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 45; HY 7/2/ 
Lf 94-96. The fact that the term "transformation" (hua) is common to 
both the Butterfly Dream story and the description of the Peng (see 
above, "A Passage") suggests that the point of the former is not 
purely skeptical. Zhuang Zhou's "transformation" may also repre- 
sent the transformation into sagehood. 
18 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 52; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 34; HY 
4/2/25-27. 
19 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 53; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 35; HY 
4/2/29-31. 
20 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 53; Watson, Basic Writings, pp. 35-36; 
HY 4/2/33-34. 
21 - Compare the monkeys Zhuangzi describes later in the Qi wu lun, 
who are furious when they are given three nuts in the morning and 
four in the evening, but are content when given four in the morning 
and three in the evening (Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 54; Watson, 
Philosophy East & West Basic Writings, p. 36; HY 5/2/38-39). 
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22 - On this issue, see David Wong, "Universalism vs. Love with Dis- 
tinctions," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16 (3/4) (September/ 
December 1989): 251-272. 
23 - Logicians would express this by saying that shi and fei are (like 
"taller than") "two-place predicates." Of course, Zhuangzi has 
given us no evidence that all evaluative terms must be two-place 
predicates, nor has he shown that there are no objective facts. 
24 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 70; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 56; HY 
10/4/39-41. 
25 - HY8/3/12. 
26 - HY 7/3/6: yi hu tian Ii. ?g 
27 - HY 7/3/7: yin qi gu ran. The mirroring metaphors of the Inner iX.,IM 
Chapters also seem to be most naturally read in an objectivist 
fashion; see HY 13/5/9-10, 17-18. 
28 - Graham, Inner Chapters, pp. 46-47; Watson, Basic Writings, pp. 
28-29; HY2/1/35-42. 
29 - See, e.g., Mengzi 4A17, 4B29, 4B31, 5B1. 
30 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 43; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 23; HY 
1/1/1-2. 
31 - Further disorientation is provided by a pun, since kun can mean 
baby fish or fish eggs. 
32 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 43; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 23; HY 
1/1/3-5. 
33 - Watson, Basic Writings, p. 23 n. 3. 
34 - According to Hanfeizi, there were eight competing Confucian sects $4-f 
by his time, and the Mohist school broke into three competing sects 
after the death of Mozi. (For the reference to Hanfeizi, see Burton 
Watson, trans., Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964), p. 118. On the Mohist schism, see A. C. 
Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters 
of Mo-tzu (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1985)) 
35-See Mengzi 5A4, 7B3, and Analects 2:23, 3:9, 9:15, 15:26 
(sectioning as in the Harvard-Yenching text). 
36 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 43; Watson, Basic Writings, pp. 23-24; 
HY 1/1/5-8. 
37 - Graham, Inner Chapters, pp. 43-44; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 24; 
HY 1/1/8-9. 
38 - Of course, this is the interpretation favored by Guo Xiang. Bryan W. Van Norden 
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39 - Victor Mair, trans., Tao Te Ching (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 
p. 7. 
40 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 44; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 24; HY 
1/1/9-13. 
^_-u 41 - The reference to "those two varmints" (zhi er chong) seems most 
naturally read as a reference to the cicada and the dove, although 
Guo Xiang (incredibly, I think) takes it to be a reference to the 
cicada and the Peng bird. But surely, if Zhuangzi had wished to 
refer to the Peng bird as well he would have referred to "those three 
varmints." 
42 - Watson, Basic Writings, p. 27; Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 46; HY 
X7k 2/1/30-31. Compare also the story in Qiu shui (Watson, Basic 
Writings, pp. 107-108; HY 45/17/69-75) of the well-frog who has 
not heard of the ocean. 
43 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 44; Watson, Basic Writings, pp. 24-25; 
HY 1/1/13-17. 
44 - Kjellberg discusses the possibility (suggested by Guo Xiang) that the 
dove and the quail represent two different kinds of failure: the dove 
envies the flight of the Peng, while the quail criticizes it. Instead, 
each (according to Guo Xiang) should be satisfied with the sort of 
flight that is appropriate to it, and neither envy nor criticize others. 
See Kjellberg, "Zhuangzi and Skepticism," p. 13 n. 5. 
45 - Graham, Inner Chapters, pp. 44-45; Watson, Basic Writings, pp. 
25-26; HY2/1/18-22. 
46 - For more on Song Rongzi, see Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese 
Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1952), 1:148-153. 
47 - Guo Xiang and Watson understand this line as meaning "The Way 
accumulates in emptiness." 
48 - Graham, Inner Chapters, pp. 68-69; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 54; 
HY 9/4/26-29. 
49 - Compare Zhuangzi's observation that "The highest person has no 
self" (see above, ref. note 45). 
50 - One philosopher who has drawn attention to the parallel between 
this passage and the Ren jian shi passage is David S. Nivison, to 
whose work I am deeply indebted. See his "Philosophical Vol- 
untarism in Fourth Century China," in David S. Nivison, Inves- 
tigations in Chinese Philosophy (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 
Philosophy East & West forthcoming). 
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51 - The related hierarchy of doctrines, intention (zhi), and qi is found in 
the Zuo zhuan, Duke Zhao, year 9. See James Legge, The Chinese 
Classics, vol. 5, The Ch'un Ts'ew with The Tso Chuen (Taipei: SMC 
Publishing, 1991), p. 626, 2d col. (English); p. 624, leftmost line 
(Chinese). 
52 - Of course, this agreement is rather thin. While Mencius thinks our 
heart is the ultimate source of moral guidance, he also thinks the 
doctrines of the sages have a moral importance that Zhuangzi 
would never allow them (cf. Mengzi 4A1). 
53 - See, e.g., Mengzi 2A6, 6A6. 
54 - See, e.g., Mengzi 1A7, 2A6. 
55 - See, e.g., Mengzi 3A5, 4B24, 7A45. 
56 - See, e.g., Mengzi 6A10, 7B31. 
57 - See above, "Distinctions and Tensions" under "Objectivism." 
58 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 89; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 83; HY 
18/6/66-67. 
59 - Yearley, "The Perfected Person." In contrast to the view I examine 
here, Yearley seems to hold that the Inner Chapters consistently 
present the radical vision, while only later portions of the Zhuangzi 
(esp. chap. 17, the Qiu shui), consistently develop the conventional 
vision. 
60 - Translation by Watson, Basic Writings, p. 35. Compare Graham, 
Inner Chapters, pp. 52-53 (note that Graham divides the text dif- 
ferently), and HY4/2/29-30. 
61 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 57; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 39; HY 
5/2/56-57. 
62 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 85; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 74; HY 
15/6/7-9. 
63 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 92; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 87; HY 
19/6/92-93. Of the two passages I cite above as possible evidence 
for the third interpretation, the first need not be interpreted in the 
way Watson recommends (compare my translation above, "Distinc- 
tions and Tensions" under "Relativism"). The second passage is con- 
sistent with the possibility that the highest sages will avoid allow- 
ing themselves to be drawn "within the six directions." Consequently, 
how we interpret these passages will depend upon what other por- 
tions of the Inner Chapters suggest about the nature of the sage. 
64 - This understanding of the importance of particularism for Zhuangzi 
was suggested by my student Gwen Parker (in conversation). Bryan W. Van Norden 
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65 - This phrase occurs only three times in the Inner Chapters: HY 3/1/ 
47, 16/6/29, and 18/6/70. Kjellberg suggests that the common view 
that "inaction" is a central part of Zhuangzi's thought is due largely 
to the historical influence of Guo Xiang's commentary (Kjellberg, 
"Zhuangzi and Skepticism," p. 29). However, I think that Guo 
Xiang may be correct in holding that "inaction" is illustrated 
throughout the Inner Chapters (as in the discussion of Cook Ding), 
even when the phrase wu wei is not used. 
66 - Compare the discussion of this point in Watson, Basic Writings, 
p. 7. 
67 - See Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, esp. chap. 1. By "good- 
ness" here I mean whatever is necessary to live a flourishing, 
worthwhile life. A related notion in contemporary discussions is 
"moral luck," which refers to the good fortune required for moral 
value, as opposed to the luck required for leading a worthwhile life 
overall. See Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck," in his Moral Luck 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 20-39, and 
Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck," in his Mortal Questions (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 24-38. 
68 - Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. Richard Green 
(New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 21. 
69 - Graham, Inner Chapters, p. 69; Watson, Basic Writings, p. 54; HY 
9/4/30. 
70 - Mengzi 4A1 1. 
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